The Origins of Meaning
(Vol.1 of Language in the Light of Evolution)

James R Hurford,
Language Evolution and Computation Research Unit,
Linguistics Department, University of Edinburgh

Published by Oxford University Press in August, 2007

Reviews by:
Dean Falk, in Nature,
Roy Harris, in THES.
Derek Bickerton, in Language and Communication
John Dance, in Journal of Consciousness Studies
Jen Maceyko, in Science and Spirit
Grover Hudson in The Linguist List
Sue Browning, of the Society for Editors and Proofreader (online review)
Teresa Bejarano, to appear in Teorema
Nick Enfield in TLS (scanned PDF)
Michael Corballis in Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development.
Martin Edwardes in Journal of Evolutionary Psychology.
``Wow, super sciency. Interesting, but my head was spinning. Good for scientists, philosophers, and very smart people.'' (Jen)

PDF of dust jacket

PREFACE

Part 1: MEANING BEFORE COMMUNICATION

• CHAPTER 1 Let's agree on terms
  • 1.1 Defining semantics with evolution in mind
  • 1.2 Health warning about `concepts'
  • 1.3 A scale from no-brainers to cognitive concepts
• CHAPTER 2 Animals approach human cognition
  • 2.1 Induction, generalization and abstraction
  • 2.2 Freewill, or at least some metacognition
  • 2.3 Object permanence and displaced reference
  • 2.4 Biological motion and animacy
  • 2.5 Structured conceptual content and transitive inference
  • 2.6 Semantic memory, a store of nonlinguistic knowledge
  • 2.7 Sensory-motor declarative-imperative co-involvement in concepts
• CHAPTER 3 A new kind of memory evolves
  • 3.1 Episodic memory in animals: knowledge of past and future
  • 3.2 Episodic memory and Kantian analytic/synthetic
• CHAPTER 4 Animals form proto-propositions
  • 4.1 The magical number 4 -- how big is a simple thought?
  • 4.2 Predicate-argument structure in animal brains
  • 4.3 Local and global attention to objects and scenes
  • 4.4 Animal truth, reference and sense
• CHAPTER 5 Toward human semantics
  • 5.1 A parsimonious Begriffsschrift for proto-propositions
  • 5.2 Getting rid of individual constants
    • 5.2.1 The principled unknowability of uniqueness
    • 5.2.2 No clinching psychological evidence
    • 5.2.3 Philosophers split both ways
  • 5.3 Getting rid of ordered arguments and role-markers
  • 5.4 One-place predicates over scenes and objects
  • 5.5 Armchair ontology of objects, events and scenes

• CHAPTER 6 Communication by dyadic acts
  • 6.1 Roughly and readily defining `communication'
  • 6.2 Pragmatic origins
  • 6.3 Things animals do to each other
  • 6.4 Getting the right environmental conditions
    • 6.4.1 The physical environment and the communication medium
    • 6.4.2 Social conditions
    • 6.4.3 Birth and ontogeny
  • 6.5 From innate to learned
• CHAPTER 7 Going triadic: precursors of reference
  • 7.1 Early manipulation of attention
  • 7.2 Indexical/deictic pointing
    • 7.2.1 Begging and pointing in animals
    • 7.2.2 Human pointing and linguistic deixis
  • 7.3 Standardized alarm and food calls
  • 7.4 Beyond innate symbols and learned deixis
• CHAPTER 8 Why communicate? Squaring with evolutionary theory
  • 8.1 Bridges, bullets, monsters and niches
  • 8.2 Evolutionary theories of altruism and cooperation
    • 8.2.1 Cooperation in language
    • 8.2.2 Kin selection and inclusive fitness
    • 8.2.3 Reciprocal altruism -- tit-for-tat
  • 8.3 Evolutionary theories of selfish communication
    • 8.3.1 Communication for display of form
    • 8.3.2 Communication for impressively relevant content
    8.4 (Cultural) group selection
• CHAPTER 9 Cooperation, fair play and trust in primates
  • 9.1 Mind-reading, a prerequisite for intentional cooperation
  • 9.2 Cooperation
  • 9.3 Fair play
  • 9.4 Trust(-worthiness), groups, faces and a hormone
  • 9.5 Wrapping up
  
  
• CHAPTER 10 Epilogue and prologue